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Chapter 14

How the City Grows
Urban Growth and Challenges to
Sustainable Development in Doha, Qatar
Andrew M. Gardner

In the short historical trajectory of sustainable development, attention to
the idea of urban sustainability has been a particularly late addition. Cities, as industrial nodes and as spaces of dense human habitation, have
long been portrayed as antithetical to sustainability. This longstanding rural bias has a sensible legacy, for among their many qualities, cities are locations where the detritus of our human existence congeals and, perhaps
more to the point, where the scale of that detritus becomes most visible.
And although sustainable development is a relatively new paradigmatic
force, the notion that cities are somehow inappropriate or problematic
venues for human habitation has a much longer and storied history in
both European and Middle Eastern traditions. In the latter tradition, Ibn
Khaldun portrayed the city as a culturally refined but morally corruptive space.1 Centuries later, these same conceptions of the city percolated
through European and American thought, and eventually came to serve as
the backdrop to substantial portions of classic Western social theory, perhaps most clearly distilled in the Jeffersonian fetishization of the agricultural livelihood (and a corresponding mistrust of the city and its denizens).
These conceptions of the city persevere, and today it is more common than
ever to find the romanticized portrait of pre-civilized and decidedly nonurban human functioning as a conceptual antidote to the excesses of our
contemporary, capitalist and highly urban world. In North America, these
perceptions cling to the Native Americans and First Nations of that continent; in Arabia, the same notions adhere to the Bedouin pastoral nomads
who traditionally populated the interior of the Peninsula.
The new focus on urban sustainability rejects this history. Certainly
the notion that pre-capitalist and non-urban humans lived lives ‘in bal-
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ance’ with nature has been challenged by a constellation of scholars who
together purvey a more supportable contention that in the history of humankind, some people seem to have found some sort of balance with their
natural environment in some places for some period of time (e.g. Lansing
1991; Diamond 2005; Smith and Wishnie 2000; Hames 2007). Presently,
however, other factors are also driving the increased attention to urban
sustainability. First, there is the stark reality of the previous decade – one
in which we passed from a primarily rural species to a primarily urban
one. More than half of the human population now dwells in cities, and we
face a future that looks ever more urban. The task of collectively creating a
more sustainable future must necessarily contend with the primary location of our species’ habitation. Second, a coterie of scholars have pointed
to the inherent efficiencies of urban life (Owen 2009; Light 2001, 2003;
see also Keil 2005). In cities, human habitation is dense. People live in
close quarters, often stacked upon one another in apartment buildings
and other densely efficient dwellings. They live close to commercial centres and to the services they require, and can often access those centres
and services by mass transit or on foot. Urban populations in developed
nations generally require less per capita infrastructure, and specifically
less of the expensive infrastructure that must (ideally) bring water, electricity, gas and asphalt to the domicile, as well as the infrastructure that
must (again, ideally) carry away waste. As these scholars argue, proximity
and density make the city inherently efficient, and their calculations suggest that the urbanite’s ecological footprint is typically smaller by several
degrees of magnitude than her suburban or rural counterpart. In other
words, within the domain of developed countries, persuasive arguments
have been made that cities are, by design, inherently more sustainable than
many other forms of human habitation.

Sustainable Development and the City
Another facet of urban sustainability, and one perhaps less clearly articulated in the literature, is that cities are increasingly prominent actors in the
vanguard of the sustainability movement. When it comes to developing,
declaring, and deploying sustainable goals, cities themselves serve as important units of collective action. Perth, Australia; Portland, Oregon; Vancouver, British Columbia, and countless other cities today function as key
stakeholders in the collective enacting of sustainable goals (Newman and
Jennings 2008). One can envision a variety of different reasons at work
here. Even the largest cities are able to develop cohesive identities capable
of articulating sustainability initiatives. Cities also provide an integrated
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political unit in which citizen groups – that is, neighbourhood groups and
other voluntary organizations that operate on a local level – can feasibly
assert their interests, in contrast to federal systems in which the voices of
these groups are lost in the scale and scope of national-level politics. Cities
are a principal apex for those energies that gather strength at the grassroots level, and they comprise a much more manageable target for change
than national or global systems. Perhaps cities also replicate the context
described by Raymond Firth in his ethnographic work with the Tikopians.
By his analysis, the small island presented a cohesive and limited resource
domain to the island’s denizens. Every adult was aware of the limitations
presented by his or her environment, and with no accessible frontier past
which more resources might be discovered or, perhaps more to the point,
past which more resources might be imagined, the Tikopians eventually
established a notably sustainable pattern of human/environmental interaction. Contemporary cities, of course, are quite different from isolated
Pacific islands; indeed, cities are central nodes in the global production,
circulation and consumption of commodities and the resources those
commodities draw upon. But cities do provide their inhabitants with a
bounded unit with which to think – a demarcated social and geographical space to which collective and potentially sustainable aspirations can
be affixed. Cities’ successes in articulating and implementing sustainable
goals have further distanced urban space from its traditional position as
the antithesis of sustainability movements.
The increasing prominence of the city in the sustainable development
discourse, however, does not correlate with the distillation or progressive coherence in that concept’s meaning. To the contrary, the concept
of sustainable development is broadly used in the contemporary world,
and over the course of its expanding currency it has come to mean many
different things to many different people. A review of sustainable development’s many meanings and the tectonic frictions underlying its ongoing florescence is beyond the scope of this chapter, and has been well
described by others (e.g. Adams 2001; Baker 2006).2 This chapter, however,
asserts a classic and critical definition of sustainable development that,
in the contemporary era, might also be posited as a radical perspective:
sustainability and sustainable development are far-reaching concepts that
require fundamental changes in our relationship to the environment, in
the structure of our social relations, and in the ideas and values we hold
dear. I suggest this definition of sustainable development as radical because of the scope of change it requires. Like other scholars, I see many
of the capitalist imperatives of the contemporary world forging societies
that aspire to constant and competitive growth, a feature that is by definition antithetical to sustainability (e.g. Broswimmer 2002). At the same
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time, I contend that this take on sustainable development is also a classic
one, in the sense that our ability to ensure future generations can meet
their needs – a feature fundamental to many enduring definitions of the
concept – remains a fine metric by which we can measure our progress (if
any) towards this goal (see Baker 2006 for a similar argument). This also
suggests that the appropriate goal for our collective aspirations should
be sustainability, rather than sustainable development, particularly for
those wealthy countries and populations that already fit the description
of ‘developed’.
This brief sketch of a radical (yet classical!) take on sustainable development merits more attention and analytic support, but as noted, those
arguments have been made elsewhere at great length (e.g. Adams 2001;
Baker 2006). With the above definition of sustainability and its relation to
the urban form in place, this chapter considers the potential challenges of
implementing a meaningful and substantive version of sustainability in
the wealthy and highly urban state of Qatar and, by proxy, the neighbouring GCC states. Qatar has explicitly expressed a commitment to sustainable development, and has integrated sustainability-oriented frameworks
into both its national vision and the urban master plan for Doha, the single urban agglomeration on the small peninsula.3 While this public and
state-driven adoption of sustainable development can be read as a sign
of sustainable development’s growing significance, many would agree
that Doha and the other astonishing cities of the Arabian Peninsula would
probably look no different today if the goal of sustainable development
had been rejected or altogether ignored rather than adopted.4
The purpose of this chapter, then, will be to consider the potential challenges of implementing a meaningful, substantive and radically transformative version of sustainability in Doha and, by association, in the other
wealthy and highly urban states of the Arabian Peninsula. After a brief
overview of city and society in Qatar, I will frame the remainder of the
article around three dilemmas I see as central obstacles to the successful
deployment of a meaningful sustainability in this city.

Khaleeji Society and the Cities of the Arabian Peninsula
With some justification, the six Gulf states of the Arabian Peninsula are
often treated as a single socio-political and cultural unit. This affiliation
is perhaps best represented by the term al khaleej, an Arabic term used
to refer to the six Gulf states (Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar, the
United Arab Emirates and Oman) in their entirety, with connotations of
the social and cultural homogeneity resulting from the strong commonali-
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ties in the history of these states’ development. The roots of this affiliation
stretch deep into history. In environmental terms, all of the Arabian Peninsula is an arid desert with extraordinarily sparse resources. Two principal
and symbiotically intertwined livelihoods historically predominated in
the region. A town-based society comprised of settled and largely urban
peoples (in Arabic, hadhari) was built upon the foundation of trade. This
trade included both maritime commerce and caravan-based trade to the
peninsula’s interior. In some parts of Arabia, limited agricultural production also occurred (particularly in Oman, parts of Saudi Arabia and
Bahrain). Along the coastal regions of the Persian Gulf, these town-based
peoples also took to the sea, and prospered from pearl production, fishing, piracy and trade, thereby forging a significant merchant class.5 The
livelihoods of the urban peoples enmeshed in these activities were historically intertwined with the second predominant livelihood, practiced by
Bedouin pastoral nomads (in Arabic, badawi) who made use of the vast
spaces between these villages and towns. While the division between
badawi and hadhari was wrought long ago, and while these categories have
historically demonstrated more flexibility than this superficial description
would suggest, the bifurcation between settled peoples and nomadic pastoral peoples has been held in place for centuries by the genealogical logic
of tribalism. This tribalism has been reaffirmed through the political organization of the contemporary Gulf state (and particularly so in Qatar).
To some degree, all six of the Gulf states historically shared a position
on the margins of the British Empire. British relations with the region were
administered via British India, although Arabia played an insubstantial
role in the Empire for much of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.
Perhaps the most important commonality in these six states’ histories is
the discovery of oil. All six of the Gulf states possess (or once possessed)
significant petroleum resources; states and economies were constructed
around the wealth generated by this resource. Today, Qatar and its neighbours are often described as rentier states. In practice, significant portions
of oil profits are diverted to a vast social welfare apparatus. Paramount
to these transfers and to the organization of these states is the public sector: immense portions of the contemporary GCC economies are operated
through the public or quasi-public sector. Citizens in Qatar and the other
Gulf states today expect public sector jobs, and the state is constructed
around the twin role of disbursing state-held wealth (its traditional twentieth-century role) and guiding the states’ diversification plans away from
petroleum dependency. While citizens of Qatar and the other Gulf States
enjoy limited political participation via municipal elections and consultative bodies, all the Gulf states are controlled by hereditary extended
families (or tribes) – the Al Thani clan in Qatar, the Al Khalifa clan in Bah-
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rain and so forth. In analytic terms, the welfare state and limited political
participation common to all the Gulf states have been conceptually linked:
scholars suggest that citizens have begrudgingly yielded their political
rights in exchange for the astonishing benefits of welfare systems that
convey wealth from state to citizen (Luciani 1987; Beblawi 1987; Kamrava
2009; see also Dresch 2006: 201). In public discourse, the leading families
of Qatar and the other Gulf states conceptualize their role as cosmopolitan
stewards of states whose principal task is to guide the more traditional
and conservative components of the respective citizenries to modernity.
Qatar and the neighbouring Gulf states are, per capita, among the
wealthiest states in the world. Citizens typically receive (and expect) subsidized or free utilities, land, education, medical care, no-interest loans
and, often, public sector jobs. Most Qataris, for example, dwell in extremely large freestanding ‘villas’, employ a small to large staff of domestic servants, and drive new or relatively new cars. Oftentimes that
car is a Toyota Landcruiser, a model that seems to function as a marker of
citizenship in contemporary Qatar. It is not unusual to encounter families
with six, eight or ten cars. While the wealth of Qatar and the other Gulf
States can be perceived at the level of the individual citizen, much of the
state-controlled wealth has been ploughed into development plans, and
much of that development is urban in nature. Museums, heritage centres,
sports arenas, skyscrapers, offshore islands, amusement parks, conference centres, national mosques, residential developments and many other
components of urban development are directly or indirectly funded with
the wealth generated by oil rents. Indeed, the pace of this urban development long ago surpassed the domestic labour supply. Today in Qatar, well
over 1 million of the 1.6 million inhabitants of the small country are foreign residents, and the largest portion of that foreign population is made
up of construction workers (typically from South Asia). Despite some of
the highest natural growth rates in the developed world, in Qatar and
several of the other wealthy GCC states citizens comprise an increasingly
small portion of the overall population: the scale of transnational labour
migration, driven largely by urban development, continues to outpace
natural growth.
Thus, urban development is a central feature of the contemporary Gulf.
Indeed, as Sharon Nagy (2000: 128) has noted, ‘The public has come to
accept, and expect, government action in the realm of development and
maintenance of the built environment.’ In most of the Gulf states, rural
populations have migrated to the city, producing one of the most urbanized collection of states in the world. In Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, Oman and
the Emirates, the large primate cities are also defined by their function as
political capitals. As I have argued elsewhere, the astonishing urban proj-
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ects that rise in the Gulf also serve a symbolic function: Gulf cities are the
trophy cases of a people and its leadership, and are directly intended to
convey a particular message about the arrival of modernity in the region
to a global audience (Gardner 2008, 2009). Sustainable development has
emerged as an important discursive element in this urban development.
Although the mission of constructing a more sustainable urban future is
often tied to plans for the respective states’ diversification away from oil
dependency, the Gulf states also recognize sustainable development as
an emergent and symbolically important attribute of the cosmopolitan
modernity purveyed by other wealthy, urban and developed nations in
the world.
With that brief background in mind, I now turn to three fundamental
and intertwined challenges to the implementation of a meaningful form of
sustainable development in the region.

Sustainable Development as a Threat to
Political Stability in the Gulf States
In the petroleum-rich state of Qatar, the unparalleled pace of urban development has become more than a fact of life for the inhabitants of the city.
Indeed, the pace itself has become emblematic of the city-state’s global
identity; urban development has taken on a fetishistic quality that pits Qatar against the neighbouring Gulf states in a competition for superlative
standing. In this competition, Formula One racetracks, large human-made
islands, stadiums capable of hosting global sports tournaments, extraordinary skyscrapers, satellite campuses of American universities and a variety of other mega-features of the urban landscape function as the symbolic
capital by which these states assert their position in the vanguard of a cosmopolitan rendition of modernity (see Nagy 2000 for an insightful analysis). This conversation with the rest of the world has a second purpose, for
in asserting their modernity through urban construction, the Gulf states
simultaneously forge unified nationalisms over the complex allegiances
and heterogeneous traditions of their citizenries. Like the Statue of Liberty
or the Eiffel Tower, the supermodern components of the Gulf city seek to
symbolically construct a homogenous idea of nation, and thereby elide the
differences characteristic of Gulf populations – the differences between
hadhari and badawi, between Shi’a and Sunni or between citizens of Arab
descent and those of Persian descent (see Nagy 2006; Longva 2006). As
this line of reasoning suggests, these cities and their dramatic expansion
can be best understood in symbolic terms.
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More practically, however, the supermodern components of these urban
landscapes are also portrayed as the infrastructure for an economically diverse future. Tourism and the ongoing development of ‘knowledge-based
economies’ to which many of these urban development projects are tied
are central features of Qatar and its neighbouring states’ plans to wean
their economies from petroleum dependency. Around the Gulf, similar
diversification plans are largely intended to recapture capital that, for the
time being, flows away from the Gulf states. A representative example of
this sort of urban development project is ‘The Pearl’, a massive residential
and commercial development constructed on a human-made island off
the coast of Qatar. As a freeholder zone in a state that allows only Qatari
citizens to own property, the residential development seeks to capture rent
and investment monies that, in the past, have been channelled by foreign
residents working in Qatar to other locations around the globe. In this
sense, the astonishing urban commercial/residential developments characteristic of the region are, as a whole, portrayed as a form of sustainable
development, in that they seek to shift economies from their obviously
unsustainable dependence on petroleum resources to a potentially more
sustainable and diversified economic foundation for the post-petroleum
era.6
Yet while urban development, and particularly the trophy architecture
of contemporary Doha, Dubai and the neighbouring cities occupies the
spotlight, the political economy that drives this urban development is
decidedly offstage. Moreover, the product of urban development includes
much more than those architectural constructions whose symbolic resonance achieves global currency. Surrounding the tall buildings, museums
and new universities is a sprawling sea of more mundane construction
perhaps best typified by the housing compound and the apartment building. In all the Gulf states, the skilled foreign class needed to build, staff
and maintain these supermodern cities is most typically housed in one
of these two residential forms, as opposed to the free-standing homes
(or ‘villas’) preferred by many khaleeji citizens, and the labour camps that
house many of the unskilled transnational migrant workers.7 Apartment
buildings, I will assume, are familiar to readers. Compounds, while certainly not unique to the Gulf, are perhaps unique in their ubiquity in the
region. Compounds in the Gulf states are characterized by the tall walls
that surround them and a single entrance with a staffed security gate.
Compounds may include villas (large single-family homes), apartments
and often a combination of the two. Many compounds contain central
recreation facilities, a small store and other services. Combined with the
proliferating apartment buildings springing up in many of the Gulf cities, these compounds serve the burgeoning transnational middle class at
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work in the region, and while they pale in the shadows of the symbolically
laden super-constructions that garner global attention, understanding the
political economy of their proliferation will lay bare the essence of my
argument: a confluence of forces at work in the Gulf states has produced a
spatially hungry system that directly challenges initiatives for sustainable
development.
As this contention suggests, I wish to add a third facet to our understanding of the astonishing urban development characteristic of the region. In addition to its purported economic function of capturing global
flows of capital, and in addition to building the idea of nation over the
heterogeneous social reality of the Gulf states, the process of urban development has become a central conduit for the transfer of wealth from
state to citizen, and hence key to the political legitimacy of the extended
families that politically (and economically) control each of the Gulf states.
A parallel argument has already been established in academic literature
concerning the public sector in the Gulf states. In Qatar and all the Gulf
states, public sector employment functions as a primary conduit for the
transfer of state-controlled petroleum wealth to its citizen-constituents. In
all of the Gulf states, foreign workers and entrepreneurs are the foundation and majority of the private sector. Citizens, meanwhile, are almost
entirely employed directly by the state in public sector jobs. In Qatar,
over 95 per cent of the citizen-workforce is employed in the public sector:
they work directly for the ministries comprising the state, for the public
utilities that serve both migrants and citizens, in the police force and national guard and in many other capacities.8 A variety of reasons have been
cited for the citizenry’s preference for work in the public sector. These
reasons include high pay and benefits of these state-provided jobs; the often gender-segregated offices that fit the cultural norms of the region (and
thereby foster women’s entry into the job market); the predominance of
Arabic in these workplaces (as opposed to English in much of the private
sector); and the timings of work in the public sector (typically, 7:00 am
to 1:00 pm). In my own previous work, I have focused on the underlying
logic of the public sector, and argued that over the previous decades this
sector of the labour market provided a differentiable system where qualities uniquely possessed by citizens – familial and tribal networks, and
wasta (an Arabic term that is roughly equivalent to social capital) – could
be used to secure employment in the public sector, thereby insulating citizens from the competitive meritocratic logic of a private sector in which
many are poorly positioned to compete (Gardner 2010). Perhaps more to
the point, however, social scientists have suggested that these public sector jobs function as the primary channel for the transfer of wealth from
state to citizen, and thereby comprise the keystone in the legitimacy of
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the Gulf states’ leadership (e.g. Willoughby 2008). Indeed, employment is
conceived as an integral part of the constellation of entitlements citizens
expect from the state.
In the context of a state dependent on extraordinarily large flows of
foreign labour (in Qatar, for example, there are more than eight foreigners for every citizen), real estate functions as a second vital conduit for
the transfer of petroleum wealth from state to citizen (see Dresch 2006:
202; also Gardner 2009). With the exception of a few special economic
zones and freeholder developments scattered around the region, only citizens can own property in the Gulf states.9 In Doha, property ownership
functions as the foundation of a scenario typical throughout the Gulf: the
Qatari state, in conjunction with a constellation of transnational energy
corporations, directly controls the wealth resulting from the sale of the
state’s petroleum reserves. In addition to controlling this wealth, the state
assumes the responsibility of guiding the nation’s infrastructural, economic and social development. In one of its various capacities – through
ministries, universities, hospitals or quasi-statal industries, the state hires
foreigners to come and design, construct, manage and operate the components of its developing city. The vast majority of the professional class
arriving on the peninsula work directly or indirectly for the public sector,
and the ministries, institutions, and companies for which they work place
them in housing compounds or buildings owned by other citizens. The
citizens who own these compounds and buildings then accumulate the
profits generated by the astronomical rents characteristic of the region – in
Doha, for example, villas in compounds can easily rent for US $4,000 or
more per month. The suburban horizon of Doha is now filled with these
compounds, and with citizens now outnumbered almost ten to one by
foreign residents, the scale of this transfer can hardly be overstated: rental
properties, in the guise of a workforce dedicated to urban development,
comprise one of the principal mechanisms for transferring wealth from
the state to its citizenry.
Yet transfers through rental properties are only the frontline of this political economy of urban development. The construction of an imagined
compound, for example, includes the efforts and energies of a constellation of other businesses – the company that makes cement, the company
that owns the trucks to move material and equipment to the site, the manpower agency that brings construction workers from South Asia to the
Gulf and the firm that designs the villas and apartments in the compound.
And once the foreign workforce is placed in the compound, villas must be
furnished, automobiles much be purchased and children’s tuition must
be paid. Indeed, vast portions of the contemporary Gulf economies are
oriented towards the project of urban growth, and countless citizens, as
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the owner/sponsors of these various enterprises, depend directly on these
transfers (and, more obliquely, upon the state’s ongoing promotion of
urban development as a national priority).
What I suggest, then, is that urban development has become an integral
component of the implicit contract between state and citizen in the Gulf
states. In its current configuration, this system is dependent upon an everpresent and ever-increasing flow of foreigners to the Gulf states.10 Put another way, the expanding contingent of foreigners employed to assist and
guide the Gulf states’ development collectively function as the currency
by which wealth is transferred from state to citizen. The highest rewards
go to those citizens who, in terms of urban development, operate at the
largest scale. The crux of the argument, then, reverses the apparent logic of
this arrangement: it is not this urban development that forges new social
relations in the Gulf, but rather the ongoing articulation of indigenous
social relations that drives urban development.11 Expanding families, and
particularly expanding powerful families, require urban development.
Guiding that development is what young, well-placed citizens do, and it
is the basis of their and their family’s economic power.
A meaningful and substantial commitment to sustainability must
include some provisions for controlling urban sprawl and, eventually,
shifting away from a growth-based economy. By briefly examining the
political economy of urban growth in the Gulf states, however, I suggest
that the model of urban growth in Qatar presents a strikingly unsustainable socio-political and economic template for the near future. This model,
while publicly conceptualized as merely the pathway towards a rapidly
approaching endpoint (the depletion of petroleum resources and a diversified socio-economic future to cope with that reality), and now promoted in the discourse of sustainable development, has become deeply
interlocked with the social and cultural fabric of the contemporary Gulf
state. Citizens’ notions of entitlement, their expectations of the state and
the high natural growth rate in the region only fuel the situation. Reining in urban growth will undermine one of the two principle conduits by
which wealth is transferred from state to citizen, and political stability in
the region is partially contingent upon the legitimacy produced by these
transfers. Hence a more sustainable model of urban growth represents a
significant potential threat to political stability in the region.

Sustainable Development in a Top-Down Society
The role urban development plays in maintaining tribal and interfamilial
relations in the respective Gulf states is a testament to the intricacies by
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which modernity, development and the state itself have been integrated
into the complex and often divisive social relations that previously predominated in the region. While urban development functions as a mechanism for maintaining traditional forms of stratification in these Arabian
societies, the top-down character of political and social power in the region also poses significant challenges to the implementation of meaningful sustainability in the region. In this section, I consider how the precepts
developed by several decades of thought concerning sustainability and
sustainable development might founder in the contemporary Gulf.
Over four decades of its articulation, sustainable development has
come to encompass a variety of grassroots approaches, community-based
initiatives, activism and proposals for re-engineering contemporary forms
of democracy. In development theory, these ‘bottom-up’ approaches
emerged in the aftermath of the collapse of the centralized, monolithic
and universalizing approach to development. The new paradigm sought
to put people first, and to build participatory models for a successful and
sustainable form of development (e.g. Chambers 1983, 1994; Cernea 1991).
Bill Adams (2001) suggests that the incorporation of indigenous knowledge and community-based approaches was central to contemporary sustainable development, and more recent attention to the nexus between
sustainable development and environmental justice clearly portrays the
ongoing legacy of the American civil rights movement in sustainable development (Agyeman, Bullard and Evans 2003: 7). For many post-Marxist
environmental scholars, participatory models and grassroots approaches
are more than just an efficient means to a more sustainable end – they
are the end goal in and of themselves. Franz Broswimmer’s call for an
‘ecological democracy’, for example, is based on the contention that the
protection of other species and their habitat will require that ‘ordinary
citizens be able to take part at the grassroots level in decision-making
that effects their environment’ (2002: 98). These participatory, communitybased and inherently democratic frameworks are particularly prominent
in the ongoing conceptualization of urban-focused sustainable development (Newman and Jennings 2008: 156).
Many popular books concerned with the implementation of sustainability in developed nations conclude with a chapter concerning what a
person can do in order to make a difference with these issues (e.g Brown
2008; Orr 2009). The basic premise of these concluding chapters seems to
be two-fold: first, we can and should make significant changes in our own
lives and households; and second, we can and should vote and politically
mobilize to help those ideas percolate into law and governing structures.
What I suggest, then, is that a close reading of the sustainable development
literature confirms the centrality of a democratic foundation to the ongo-
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ing articulation of sustainable development’s goals, as well as the methods
and practices by which those goals can be achieved. Furthermore, while a
significant portion of ‘mainstream’ sustainable development assumes this
essentially democratic foundation, a significantly larger portion of what
I have described as radical/classical sustainable development does the
same, particularly in those radical renditions of sustainable development
that challenge state-based deployment of a sustainability friendly to the
interests of a corporate-dominated economy. Similarly, much of urban
sustainability theory and practice suggests that individuals must have
more power and control over the environment they live in and depend
upon. In much sustainability theory, this power and control is portrayed
either explicitly or implicitly in democratic terms.
Considering the assuredly non-democratic political structure of Qatar
and the other Gulf states, how transferable is the package of ideas and
methods operating under the banner of sustainable development? Qatar
and its neighbouring states lack many of the political and social components that play a central role in the practice of sustainable development.
Civil society in the region is generally perceived as absent, anemic or
imported (Kamrava 2009; Reiche 2010). Claims of indigeneity are muted
or absent: those Bedouin groups with claims of indigeneity are not participants in the growing congress of global indigenous peoples. Citizens
rarely form neighbourhood groups or action committees to assert sustainability initiatives. In the larger lexicon of sustainability practice, this suggests that ‘increasing awareness’, which seems to perennially serve as the
most palatable aspect of a typical sustainability campaign, would not have
the same sort of traction here as one might expect elsewhere in the world.
Because citizens in Qatar and the other Gulf states rarely have the power
to elect the officials who might configure social and environmental policy,
the impact of grassroots organization – or, simply changing citizens’ perspectives on the importance of the environment – is structurally de-linked
from its conceptual fruition in policy and law. Instead, political power in
the region is strongly top-down: leaders assume the role of configuring
appropriate policy for state and citizenry, and citizens generally yield individual or personal responsibility for social, economic or environmental
change to that leadership. This top-down approach is evident in the broad
penchant for master planning, the strikingly opaque and primary driving
force behind sustainable development in the region (which I will consider
in more depth in the next section).
While my basic contention, then, is that the social, cultural and political
context of the contemporary Gulf state meshes poorly with many of the
central assumptions of sustainable development theory and practice, one
might also consider the potential advantages of the top-down political
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structure of Qatar and the other Gulf states in building a more sustainable
future. Significant policy steps towards sustainability are, in many ways,
simply one decree away from reality in the contemporary Gulf. Combined
with the possibilities produced by the astonishing wealth of these states,
the top-down structure of policy decision making yields a nimbleness
that might potentially benefit sustainability, for policy decisions avoid
the mire of congressional or parliamentary politics typical of Western and
democratic forms of governance. Furthermore, I would also add that even
foreigners with a few months of experience in the Gulf states can quickly
perceive that simply classifying these societies as ‘non-democratic’ does
little justice to societies in which citizens are, in many senses, quite capable
of voicing their concerns through indigenous familial and tribal networks.
While citizens may lack the capacity to elect representative leaders, other
networks, including tribal and familial associations, social networks and
professional connections provide ample opportunity for many citizens
to assert their opinions to policy makers and power holders. These very
same networks challenge the rigid definitions of civil society developed in
the west and purveyed broadly in the critiques levied against the region.
So perhaps the better question is this: how can these indigenous forms
of social relation and consultation come to play an instrumental role in
building a sustainability drive at the grassroots or community level?
With those important caveats aside, the centralized and top-down nature of political power in the Gulf states has resulted in a highly filtered
rendition of sustainable development. In practice, the models of sustainability promoted and adopted by the state focus heavily on technological
innovation and infrastructural development. These particular aspects of
sustainable development mesh seamlessly with the imperative of urban
development described in the previous section, while simultaneously
marginalizing the more threatening socio-cultural and political facets of
the sustainability paradigm.

Master Planning and the Perils of Supermodernism
In practice, the imperative of urban development and the top-down political structure of the Gulf state coalesce in urban master planning. As the
primary avenue by which sustainable development is articulated in the
contemporary Gulf states, master planning drives urban development
– an urban development, as I have argued above, that is a socio-political necessity in the typical Gulf state. Master planning also confirms the
central role of the state and its hereditary leaders in that urban development and, therefore, in the extrapolation of urban sustainable develop-
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ment. In addition to reinforcing the top-down structure of political power,
and in addition to fuelling the transfer of wealth via urban development,
the discourse of master planning in the Gulf produces an urban form
that diverges significantly from the models and best practices that have
accumulated in decades of conversation about urban sustainability and
sustainable development. More specifically, I will argue that the supermodernism that results from urban master planning in the Gulf city consigns sustainability to a spatial discourse antithetical to its meaningful
implementation.
The modern Gulf home is behind a tall wall. The wall itself delineates
the property and yields a culturally normative degree of privacy to the
family that resides behind that wall. The private spaces inside these walls
are often highly manicured, carefully tended and surprisingly green. This
managed and manicured private space contrasts sharply with the interstitial land between and beyond these walls. From a vista anywhere in
the suburbs of Doha, one can observe a strange combination of elements:
high walls that shield private space from view, towering mansions that
peer over the walls that surround them and chaotic interstitial space that
fills the space between and beyond these ubiquitous walls. This interstitial
space is of particular note – piles of construction debris lay abandoned, ad
hoc dirt lanes become shortcuts between boulevards, sidewalks peter out
in the hardscrabble desert and garbage blown by the wind accrues against
the exteriors of these walls (see figure 14.1). In passing from these chaotic
and abandoned interstitial spaces into the private spaces of the family
property, one crosses the distinct threshold between disorder and order.
This sharp contrast is not consigned to the residential level. Aspire
Park, for example, is the agglomeration of stadiums, parkland and athletic
facilities built to host the 2006 Asian Games (see figure 14.2). This highly
managed and modernistic space abuts two large shopping malls. It now
functions as a public park, and is cared for by a small army of South Asian
custodians, gardeners and guards. The interior of the park echoes James
Holston’s description (1989) of Brasilia and James Scott’s (1998) critical
description of the urban results of high-modern design. Humans struggle
to make use of the intricately planned spaces and pedestrian boulevards
that carefully connect the various facilities of the park. They are dwarfed
by the surroundings, and even when people are about the park feels almost empty. In contrast to the centre of this planned space, the periphery
of the park is chaotic: rickety chain-link fences demarcate the transition to
unplanned interstitial space. Walking paths simply end in a rocky dirt lot;
grass fields suddenly give way to gravel or sand. Indeed, the threshold
one encounters upon entering walled private property is replicated at
this supermodern scale: at the interstices of the massive planned develop-
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Figure 14.1. Debris outside the wall of a housing compound. Photograph by
Kristin Giordano.

ments and trophy projects typical of the Gulf city, the managed and manicured gives way to empty lots, debris, gravel and sand.
The lived experience of dwelling in the modern Gulf city, then, involves movement back and forth across the threshold between modernistic planned spaces and the chaos of the interstitial space that surrounds
them. I suggest this experience is indicative of one of the principle patterns of the Gulf city: the energy, planning and management of the Gulf
city is directed inwardly at the discrete units of urban space. Surrounding
these planned and modern spaces is the field they punctuate – an interstitial urban domain seemingly beyond the gaze of urban planners. This
pattern can be traced across scales in the Gulf city: the threshold observed
at the level of the individual residence is replicated at the level of the supermodern structures that now proliferate in the urban environment of
the region.
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Figure 14.2. Aspire Park grounds on the weekend. Photograph by Kristin
Giordano.

The term supermodernism has a long and vibrant pedigree (Ibelings
1995; Auge 1995). Here, I am interested the portion of that discussion
which concerns the expanding scope of these planned modern spaces. In
the Gulf states, rapid urban development and the extraordinary wealth
flowing through the region have continually expanded the scale of the
typical component of urban development. The planning and construction
of hotels, particular buildings, parks or mosques continues, but increasingly larger spaces are being incorporated into this supermodernist and
highly planned spatial discourse.12 In part, supermodernism refers to the
expansive scale of these constructions, a spatial discourse in which whole
planned communities, discrete ‘cities’, offshore islands and other vast
planned spaces sprout in and around the city. In Doha, for example, The
Pearl development, which was briefly described earlier in this chapter, is
a resort-like residential and commercial development constructed on a
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large human-made island just north of the city. It is intended to be home
to some 40,000 residents in a combination of private villas and tall apartment buildings. The Pearl includes dozens of restaurants, high-end hotels, a marina, commercial space and, perhaps most problematically, only
four lanes of road connecting it with the mainland peninsula. Similarly,
‘Education City’ is a vast complex of American Universities and other
institutions located in what is for the time being the periphery of urban
Doha. In Dubai, these supermodern spaces have proliferated for years:
‘Internet City’ is a free economic zone and information technology park;
Media City is a tax-free zone intended to attract the media industry active
in the region; Knowledge Village, International Humanitarian City is an
independent free zone authority that houses institutions devoted to internationally-focused humanitarian aid and international development; the
Masdar Project in Abu Dhabi is a sustainable city (intended to have a zerocarbon footprint) capable of housing approximately 50,000 people upon
completion. These are only a handful of the numerous examples that, as
I have already suggested, are emblematic of the spatial discourse central
to urban development in the region – a spatial discourse that, following
others, I refer to as supermodernism (e.g. Ackley 2007).
In other published work, I have envisioned this spatialization of the
urban form as a strategic plan to compartmentalize foreign matter, to
segregate that foreign matter, and to thereby assert the predominance of
indigenous culture and its sovereignty over the vast flows of people and
culture hosted by the Gulf states.13 This explanation echoes the conceptualization of graduated sovereignty as one of the principle tools by which
Asian states strategically grapple with neoliberal flows. Here, however,
my focus is on the implications of this pattern of urban development for
the expressed goal of sustainability in the urban centres of the region.
The supermodern compartmentalization of urban development in Doha,
Dubai and the other Gulf cities functions as the principal frame for urban
sustainability: in Masdar City, the region’s first and largest attempt to construct a ‘sustainable’ city, we see the significant capital at hand devoted to
the sorts of sustainable goals that other cities only dream of, particularly
through the utilization of a constellation of technologies targeting net-zero
carbon emissions (Reiche 2009, 2010; Sgouridis and Kennedy 2009). Qatar
now has its own plans for an ‘Energy City’ that will use the latest green
technology, rely heavily on solar energy and work carefully to improve air
and water quality while reducing the waste stream (Reiche 2010). These
projects interlock with the political economy of urban development, for
their construction and ongoing maintenance relies upon the foreign labour that transfers wealth from state to citizenry. Supermodern urban
development also confirms the top-down structure of political power in
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the Gulf states – even if the projects are not directly implemented by the
state, the land grants and permits for developments of this scale require
intricate connections with the top echelons of the Gulf state. But my concern here is with the product of this system and, more specifically, with the
friction between urban supermodernism and sustainability.
I suggest two essential and interrelated flaws inherent to the spatial discourse evinced by these projects and plans. First, descriptions of Masdar
City footnote the fact that some 40,000 to 60,000 workers will commute to
the planned city on a daily basis. Throughout the Gulf, these supermodern projects and monumental spaces are the visible stage presented to the
cosmopolitan global audience. Behind the stage curtain, however, lie the
support industries, service facilities and labour camps that house these
immense labour forces. In Qatar, the South Asian labour force that builds,
cleans, maintains and serves the various supermodern projects and urban
spaces in Doha typically resides in the Industrial Area, a gritty and expansive grid of industry and labour camps at the periphery of the city. Similar
areas exist in most of the Gulf cities, and plans for extensive ‘Bachelor Cities’ abound in planning circles throughout the Gulf. This offstage activity
is central to the day-to-day operation of the Gulf city. It belies the discrete
and compartmentalized presentation of these supermodern spaces, and in
this case, challenges the logic of Masdar’s calculation of its sustainability
– how can a discrete and bounded ‘sustainable city’ account for the impact
of the vast labour force that traverses the backstage/frontstage divide
every workday?
Second, the compartmentalization of sustainability to a master-planned
development essentially consigns sustainability initiatives to the status
shared by the constellation of other principles, ideas and whims guiding
the spatial articulation of the Gulf city. In other words, a ‘sustainable city’
located on the periphery of Abu Dhabi frames sustainability as a thematic
attraction – a symbolic commodity scavenged from environmental and
urban discourses to exemplify the modernity of the nation (see Hubbert
2009). In this spatial discourse, sustainability is therefore on par with the
industry of ‘Industry City’ in Dubai, with education in Doha’s ‘Education
City’ or with the opulent Venetian conception of The Pearl offshore residential community in Qatar. Moreover, the spatial compartmentalization
of sustainability to one of many master-planned supermodern Gulf spaces
corresponds with the ideological compartmentalization of sustainability
as both distinct and equivalent to the constellation of other objectives of
the contemporary nation-state.14 While the master-planning frame preserves the political economy of urban development and the centralization of power in the state and its leadership, it contrasts with the central
contentions of the meaningful rendition of sustainability sketched at the
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outset of this chapter: forging a sustainable future requires comprehensive
action in all facets of urban existence. There can be no compartmentalized
solutions.
The contemporary Gulf city suggests that, as humans, we are capable
of working together to construct and perhaps maintain these discrete and
highly managed places – a skyscraper, a shopping mall, a home, a park,
even a vast master-planned residential community. But a short trip around
Doha or any of the other Gulf cities also suggests the difficulty of linking
these discrete, managed spaces together into a functional and potentially
sustainable whole. This observation leaves me with questions. Can a sustainable urban environment really be master planned? Can we connect
all the complex pieces and parts that comprise a planned city? Or is the
managed and manicured perfection of modernism and its master plans an
elusive goal? Will these chaotic interstitial spaces always exist? And will
the cities of the Gulf always need a dirty backstage, like the bachelor cities
now being constructed around the Gulf, or Doha’s industrial area, where
I spend my weekends interviewing migrant labourers who live in a Doha
that most middle class residents never see?

Conclusion
In her introductory comments to a recent conference, Qatar University’s
president, Dr. Sheikha Abdulla Al-Misnad, expressed an interest in how
sustainability might serve as a counterbalance to the sense of entitlement
and, more broadly, the rampant consumerism that has taken hold amongst
the citizens of the khaleeji states.15 Three decades ago, Sulayman Khalaf described something quite similar to the problem identified by the university’s president – a broad set of cultural conditions that manifest themselves
in the individual as what he describes as ‘the notion of unlimited good’
(1992). In my own conversations with Qatari citizens, the extraordinary
level of consumption typical of the Gulf citizen is often juxtaposed with
the impoverished past from which many citizens’ parents and grandparents emerged. Petroleum wealth, often conceived as a blessing from
Allah in reward for the penurious past, has provided them with an era of
plentitude. At the current juncture, that consumer culture is the focus of
much conversation but very little scholarship in the Gulf states. In a sense,
these broader cultural issues lurk behind the more focused analysis I have
provided here, and certainly merit more sustained attention.
In my analysis I have attempted to delineate three arenas of potential
difficulty for the implementation of a substantial and meaningful sustainability. To recapitulate, I first suggest that urban development has become
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an integral conduit for the transfer of state-controlled wealth to its citizenry, and that interrupting urban development in the interests of longterm sustainability will potentially disturb the legitimacy constructed by
the political leaders in the GCC states. Second, I contend that the sociopolitical organization of the GCC states poorly matches the fundamentally
democratic assumptions under-girding both theory and praxis in sustainability. Finally, I question whether a meaningful and transformative form
of sustainable development can truly be master planned for the urban
environment. As I suggest, the predominant spatial discourse of urban development in the region produces highly organized and managed spaces,
but also seems to produce interstitial and backstage spaces of a strikingly
different character. None of the conditions described here are consigned
to the Gulf alone, and it’s certainly true that the implementation of the
meaningful, substantial and transformative sustainability I chart at the
outset of this chapter would face significant, if not insurmountable, challenges in a variety of socio-cultural settings. With significant reservoirs of
capital at hand, however, the Gulf States seek to move rapidly towards
these expressed goals. This chapter seeks to chart several significant
problems that have yet to enter the public discourse about sustainability
in the region.

Notes
This chapter was originally presented as ‘Doha and Sustainability: An Overview
of Urban Sustainability and Four Questions’ for the second International Social
Sciences Symposium: Sustainable Development: Issues and Challenges, Qatar
University, 4 November 2009.
1. See von Sivers (1980) for a longer discussion of Ibn Khaldun’s conception of
the city.
2. Adams (2001) constructs his analysis of the florescence of sustainable development thinking around what he calls the mainstream and the counter-current
definitions. Baker provides a more complex categorization, including idealists, proponents of a strong version of sustainable development, proponents
of a weak version of sustainable development, and proponents of an approach
consigned to controlling pollution (Baker 2006: 30–31).
3. Two of many published examples include (Qatar 2006a, 2006b).
4. This is not to suggest the same critique does not apply to most cities of the
world.
5. These coastal towns were important nodes of social and cultural heterogeneity in the region. The entirety of the region also shares a history in the ambit of
British imperialism, largely administered via British India. All of the states are
deeply Islamic and, with the exception of Oman, Sunni, although a significant
Shi’a population resides in western Saudi Arabia and in Bahrain.
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6. Reiche (2009: 379) briefly makes this point in his discussion of the impetus
behind Abu Dhabi’s construction of Masdar City.
7. Nagy (2006) details the proliferation of the villa in Qatar as a force of social
change.
8. While the line between the public and private sector is difficult to clearly delineate in the Gulf states, a variety of sources point to the ongoing centrality
of the government in supporting industries and apportioning jobs to citizens
(Qatar 2007: 26; Berrebi, Martorell and Tanner 2009; Willoughby 2008; Niblock
2007).
9. Although the proliferation of these spaces led Basar (2007: 103) to note a ‘freehold revolution’ in the extrapolation of Dubai’s urban model.
10. Indeed, one suspects that the plans for a tourist-based economy have misapprehended the flow of skilled foreign labour employed in the region as
evidence of an economically substantial population interested in recreational
travel to the Gulf states.
11. It is also of note that as a result of this arrangement both state and citizen have
configured and idealized roles as stewards of the development process.
12. See Nagy (2000) for a portrait of master planning in Doha a decade ago.
13. See Gardner 2010, 2009, 2008.
14. It should be noted that Masdar was conceived as an innovative supermodern
space from which sustainable ideas and practices would eventually flow to
Emirati society at large, a process Reiche (2010: 2) refers to as ‘policy transfer’.
15. Dr. Sheikha al-Misnad, keynote address, the Second International Social Sciences Symposium, Qatar University, 5 November 2009.
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